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Abstract
Multifaceted problems such as sustainable development typically involve complex arrangements of institutions and instru-
ments and the subject of how best to design and operate such ‘mixes’, ‘bundles’ or ‘portfolios’ of policy tools is an ongoing
issue in this area. One aspect of this question is that some mixes are more difficult to design and operate than others.
The paper argues that, ceteris paribus, complex policy-making faces substantial risks of failure when horizontal or vertical
dimensions of policy-making are not well integrated. The paper outlines a model of policy mix types which highlights the
design problems associated with more complex arrangements and presents two case studies of similarly structured mixes
in the areas of marine parks in Australia and coastal zonemanagement in Europe—one a failure and the other a successful
case of integration—to illustrate how such mixes can be better designed and managed more effectively.
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1. Introduction: The Issue of Optimality in Complex
Policy Portfolios
The complexity of contemporary socio-economic and en-
vironmental problems and the requirements of planning
for the needs of client groups and affected regions are
problems which challenge policy-makers on many lev-
els (Levin, Cashore, Bernstein, & Auld, 2012). Protect-
ing components of, and entire, eco-systems under con-
ditions of global warming, for example, increasingly in-
volves the development and implementation of arrange-
ments of policy goals and instruments in ‘policy mixes’
(Kern & Howlett, 2009), and how best to design such
mixes is an ongoing issue in the policy sciences.
After several decades of policy-making experience
and research in many countries, it is evident that sector-
alized, uni-dimensional, and uncoordinated policies do
not serve well the cause of many complex policy prob-
lems, such as sustainable development or dealing with
hunger or homelessness (Cejudo &Michel, 2017). While
many studies have noted these issues and the need for
a more integrated approach to policy-making in such ar-
eas (Briassoulis, 2014; Jordan & Lenschow, 2008, 2010),
how exactly policies are to be better integrated remains
unclear (Candel, Jeroen, & Biesbroek, 2016).
As this paper argues, answering this question re-
quires, among other things, a better understanding of
the nature of policy mixes than presently exists in the
literature. This subject has been the central concern of
recent works delving into the examination of ‘packages’;
‘bundles’ or ‘portfolios’ of policy tools in the policy sci-
ences (Chapman, 2003; Doremus, 2003; Hennicke, 2004;
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Milkman, 2012) and bringing the insights of this litera-
ture to bear on policy design in complex problem areas
is the aim of this paper.
The discussion below sets out amodel of policymixes
focusing on the nature of the tools required to address
complex policy problems in order to better define what
integration means in such contexts. It then examines the
history of efforts to promote integrated policy mixes in
two environmental issue areas with severe co-ordination
problems—coastal zone management (ICZM) in Europe
and marine park management in Australia. The first ef-
fort was a failure and the second a success, allowing
lessons to be derived from these cases about how to de-
sign and manage integrated tool packages.
2. Policy Mixes and Their Vicissitudes
Most policy areas involve the development and opera-
tion of mixes of policy tools and aims. At their most ba-
sic, policy mixes can be thought of as bundles of indi-
vidual policy instruments or tools and techniques used
by government in order to achieve their policy goals
(Howlett, 2005).
Some problem areas are more complex than others,
however, and result in more complex policy mixes. En-
vironmental policies, for example, commonly combine
market and regulation-based instruments and include
combinations of tools such as regulations on discharges
and chemical use, mechanisms for assessing fees or
taxes on environmental degradation, tradable permits
which establish overall levels of pollution and allocate
themamong firms.Market friction reduction efforts such
as enactment of liability rules designed to encourage
firms to consider the potential environmental damages
of their decisions, information programs such as product
labelling requirements and reporting requirements, and
government subsidy reductions which attempt to reduce
the inefficient behaviour promoted bymany government
subsidy programs (Anderson et al., 2010). They often
also involve user charges intended to promote compli-
ance with first and second equimarginality rules (Tieten-
berg & Lewis, 2008) and lead firms to reduce emissions
to the point where the marginal abatement cost equals
the tax rate.
There are always significant interactive effects
among the policy goals, sectors and governments in-
volved which also add to the complexity of policy design
and the difficulties encountered in pursuing effective in-
tegration (Boonekamp, 2006; Del Río, 2010; Grabosky,
1995; LePlay & Thoyer, 2011; Yi & Feiock, 2012). This
is because in many circumstances ‘supplementary’ or
‘complimentary’ tools are often required to control side-
effects or otherwise bolster the use of more ‘primary’
tools (Hou & Brewer, 2010; Tinbergen, 1952).
And there is also a temporal dimension to com-
plexity as, in many cases, tools and instruments from
one era have been ‘layered’ on top of others in an of-
ten less than rational process of matching overall pol-
icy means with goals, resulting in inconsistencies and in-
congruencies in tools embedded in such arrangements
(Howlett & Mukherjee, 2014; Howlett & Rayner, 2004).
And this complexity is augmented even furtherwhen tool
choices and preferred combinations of instruments deal
with ideological or even ‘aesthetic’ preferences in tool
choices and goal articulation rather than issues around
efficiency or equity, and when they involve trade-offs
and bargaining between actors in choosing types of tools,
goals and policies (Beland & Wadden, 2012; Williams &
Balaz, 1999).
The existing evidence shows that for all these rea-
sons, suboptimal situations in which duplication and
unnecessary redundancies and gaps remain in existing
policy mixes are very common. And this is more likely
to occur in complex problem areas with many actors
and affected parties involved in mixes which have de-
veloped over lengthy periods of time, a situation which
again is not exceptional in policy-making but rather
quite common.
The nature of such mixes focuses attention on is-
sues related to their development and alteration over
time, such as exactly how the sequencing of instrument
choices occurs and how negative policy legacies can be
overcome (Taeihagh, Givoni, & Bañares-Alcántara, 2013).
Despite the difficulties involved in identifying the ele-
ments of such mixes and how they emerge, as the case
studies presented below illustrate, understanding the na-
ture of the existingmix and its evolution aids understand-
ing of how it can be altered to help improve policy out-
puts and outcomes.
3. Enhancing Integration as Enhancing
Complementarity and Minimizing Inconsistency
among Policy Instruments
The issue of the nature of the design of ‘optimal’ bun-
dles of tools in policy mixes has only recently begun
to be addressed by policy scholars (Howlett, 2005; Pe-
ters, 2005). Most existing literature on policy tools and
goals to date, rather, has focused on single instrument
choices and less complex designs (Salamon, 1989; Tre-
bilcock & Prichard, 1983; Tupper & Doern, 1981). Such
studies, unfortunately, provide only limited insight into
how to design and operatemore complex, but quite com-
mon, ‘portfolios’ of tools (Jordan, Benson,Wurzel, & Zito,
2011; Jordan, Benson, Zito, & Wurzel, 2012).
Integration—understood as the smooth coexistence
of the different elements of policy, including goals, poli-
cies and government levels involved in policy mix design
and creation, so that conflicts are minimized and, if pos-
sible, synergies and complementarities are promoted—
has been identified repeatedly as a key feature of well-
performing mixes (Briassoulis, 2004; Howlett, 2004).
One major issue identified in the design and opera-
tion of any mix linked to poor integration, for example, is
that the tools involved and invoked in amixmay be inher-
ently contradictory (Gunningham, Grabosky, & Sinclair,
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1998; Tinbergen, 1952). That is, they may evoke contra-
dictory responses from policy targets, cancelling out or
confusing their effects (Schneider & Ingram, 1990, 1993,
1994, 1997, 2005) such as occurs, for example, when a
subsidy is provided to encourage certain kinds of produc-
tion while that production is simultaneously discouraged
through various forms of regulation (Grabosky, 1995).
The potential for such contradictory relationships to ex-
ist increases as the number of tools in a mix increases
and steps should be taken to identify and reduce their
number if better integration is to occur.
Similarly, other combinations of tools may be more
virtuous in providing a reinforcing or supplementing ar-
rangement (Hou & Brewer, 2010). And some arrange-
ments may be unnecessarily duplicative while in oth-
ers some redundancy may be advantageous (Braathen,
2005, 2007) as occurs for instance in the provision ofmul-
tiple programmes to help offset poverty or illness. Again,
better integration involves promoting as many positive
relationships as possible within a mix.
Avoiding ill-effects and bolstering positive interac-
tions within portfolios and thereby promote better in-
tegration is thus a central aim and concern of policy-
makers. But achieving this higher level of integration is
not a simple thing to accomplish. In the case of eco-
system services, for example, co-ordination problems are
omnipresent. One such challenge there concerns prop-
erly identifying the appropriate tax rate or user charge to
be used. Ideally this should be set equal to the marginal
benefits of environmental preservation at an efficient
level of preservation. However, there is likely to be un-
certainty among policy-makers as to how firms will re-
spond to a given level of taxation and about what is
the most efficient level of preservation. Tradable per-
mits allow firms which keep below their allotted level to
sell their surplus permits or use them to offset excess
emissions in other parts of their operations. Their use,
however, raises other issues such as how to properly al-
locate permits between techniques such as auctioning,
grandfathering or benchmarking, among other possibil-
ities. Moreover, there are additional issues associated
with the possible joint effects of user charges and trade-
able permits as well as the other components of an eco-
system services mix which must be taken into account if
efforts in this area are to be effective.
These integration issues become evenmore complex
when the political economy of policy-making is taken
into account. That is, certain groups of actors may pro-
mote certain options without regard for their impact on
other elements of a mix—for example when forest com-
panies advocate for greater cut allotments without tak-
ing into account their impact on fisheries or endangered
species—andwhen historical problems of policy legacies
exist in a sector (Kiss, Manchón, & Neij, 2012). Older
programmes and policies which have conferred benefits
on certain actors, for example, can make it very costly
to shift to other arrangements (Anderson et al., 2010)
and many existing mixes have developed haphazardly
through processes of policy layering, in which new tools
and objectives have been piled on top of older ones, cre-
ating a palimpsest-like mixture of inconsistent and inco-
herent policy elements (Carter, 2012; Thelen, 2004; van
der Heijden, 2011). Factors such as increasing efforts to
promote collaborative or horizontal governance arrange-
ments also affect the number ofmulti-sectoral andmulti-
policy situations which exist (Peters, 1998) and raise the
issue of policy integration to the forefront of policy de-
sign considerations.
3.1. Enhancing Integration in Instrument Mixes:
Understanding Verticality and Horizontality
The argument presented here is that the first step in ad-
dressing and improving policy integration in any policy
mix involves accurately diagnosing its level of complexity.
As Table 1 shows, several distinct mix types exist
based on the number of goals, the number of policies
and the number of levels of government involved in the
construction and maintenance of a policy ‘portfolio’ or
‘bundle’ (Howlett & del Río, 2015).
The first two situations can be thought of as ‘horizon-
tal’ ones which occur within the same level of govern-
ment, for example, at the level of a single national, inter-
national, state or local government. The third situation,
however, adds an additional ‘vertical’ complication, high-
lighting the manner in which the elements of a mix also
have to be co-ordinated across levels of government.
The degree of complexity and the need for, and diffi-
culty in achieving integration grows with the increase in
the number of goals, policies and levels of government in-
volved; that is, as the degree of horizontality and vertical-
ity increases. ‘Horizontal’ design considerations increase
as the number of problems or issues to be addressed in-
creased. Determining the efficiency of price-based (tax)
environmental systems compared with quantity-based
(tradable permit) systems, for example, is clear when
cost curves are rather flat; then quantity instruments are
superior to price instruments. But in many cases the rel-
ative shape of the benefit and cost functions of abate-
ment may be unknown (Weitzman, 1974). Also, the long-
term cost-effectiveness of taxes versus tradable permits
is affected by the relative responses of targets to market-
Table 1. Spectrum of tool mix complexity.
Simple Complex
Single Goals, Policies and
Levels
Single Goals in Multiple
Policies or Levels
Multiple Goals in Multiple
Policies or Levels
Multiple Goals in Multiple
Policies and Levels
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based tools in terms of effects on aggregate emissions
and permit prices. These outputs are affected by fac-
tors such as economic growth, inflation, or exogenous
technical change but are linked primarily to the num-
ber and type of actors and targets involved (Anderson
et al., 2010).
These horizontal issues are serious ones in and of
themselves but integration is made even more complex
and difficult by the existence of any kind of ‘verticality’
or the involvement of policy actors and elements at dif-
ferent levels of government. That is, in addition to the is-
sues raised above concerning the kinds of contradictory
or complementary relationships existing between tools
within a single level of policy-making (Hosseus & Pal,
1997) when a second, ‘vertical’ dimension is present
the level of complexity and the integration challenge
increases exponentially. The administrative and legisla-
tive arrangements present in federal and non-federal
systems, for example, greatly enhance the number of
multi-governmental mixes which exist in such jurisdic-
tions (Bolleyer & Borzel, 2010; Howlett, 1999) as do spa-
tial and other issues which allow policy problems to
cross jurisdictional boundaries, as is very common in
environmental policy, for example, but also in others
such as refugee flows or international trade and indus-
trial activity.
These latter multi-policy, multi-goal and multi-
instrument mixes—what Milkman (2012) calls ‘policy
bundles’—are examples of policy portfolios which are
typically much more complex than single or multiple
instrument mixes (Chapman, 2003; del Río, 2014; Hen-
nicke, 2004; Howlett & del Río, 2015) and pose the great-
est integration challenges. They typically involve more
than simple functional logics linking deployment of a
single policy tool such as regulation or tax incentives to
accomplishment of a single policy goal and require ad-
ditional efforts to integrate their various parts which
simpler mixes or single instrument choices typically
do not.
Conflicts with respect to goals and instruments are
likely to be more common and prominent whenmultiple
jurisdictions are involved. This is so because in suchmulti-
level government and governance contexts (Hooghe &
Marks, 2003), different levels of government are likely
to have some common, but also different goals and in-
strument preferences (Enderlein, Wälti, & Zürn, 2011).
These mixes have rarely been studied from a policy inte-
gration perspective and the two cases studies presented
below illustrate the kinds of mechanisms which have
been used, both successfully and unsuccessfully, in two
of these efforts. As the cases show, reconciling the com-
ponents of complex mixes involves not just efforts at bet-
ter horizontal integration but also the use of an overt po-
litical calculus of intra- or intergovernmental bargaining
and decision-making and the presence or absence of ef-
fective multi-level governance arrangements is a signifi-
cant factor affecting integration (Bolleyer & Borzel, 2010;
Kaiser, Kaiser, & Biela, 2012).
4. Two Case Studies of Policy Mix Design: Learning
from the Integration Experience of ICZM in Europe and
The Great Barrier Reef in Australia
Given the trans-boundary nature of many environmen-
tal issues, it is common in the environmental sphere for
several levels of government to be involved in policy-
making processes, including the supranational, national,
regional and local, and such issue areas provide good il-
lustrations of the difficulties, and solutions, involved in
integrating such complexmixes (del Río, 2009; Howlett &
del Río, 2015). This makes the study of such cases a good
one for comparative analysis of the (in)effectiveness of
efforts to enhance vertical policy integration in complex
policy mixes.
The two cases set out below—efforts to implement
Integrated Coastal Zone Management (ICZM) in Europe
as well as efforts in Australia to manage Marine Pro-
tected Areas—illustrate how mixes of this type face ad-
ditional risks of failure due to lack of integration across
levels of government and policy elements. The cases
show these are difficult, but not impossible, to correct
(Howlett, Ramesh, & Wu, 2015; Keast, Brown, & Man-
dell, 2007).
The first case can be considered a failure and the sec-
ond a success as far as integration is concerned.Why this
was the case andwhat lessons can be learned from these
experiences are set out below.
4.1. ICZM in the European Union
ICZM has been a favoured planning tool of the interna-
tional development community for many years. Better
vertical integration of environmental policy and manage-
ment efforts has been a major goal of the pursuit of sus-
tainability by the UNCED (1992) and other efforts such
as theWorld Summit on Sustainable Development which
passed the Johannesburg Plan of Action in 2002.
ICZM figured prominently in the United Nations Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries (FAO, 1995; Humphreys & Bur-
bridge, 2003), and Agenda 21 pushed ICZM forward by
emphasizing a general commitment on the part of na-
tions to pursue integrated management of coastal ar-
eas and themarine environment. This occurred together
with a specific call for the development of multilateral
ICZM frameworks and guidelines.
Although theOECDwas also actively promoting ICZM
at this time, the World Bank took the lead and their
Guidelines were adopted at the 1993 World Coast Con-
ference in Noordwijk, Holland. UNEP’s guidelines for
ICZM in the Regional Seas Program also stressed the im-
portance of strengthening cross-sectoral management
for successful policy integration. While various guide-
lines and protocols exist in different regions (for instance
in the Mediterranean—the ICZM Protocol to Barcelona
Convention for the Mediterranean Sea passed in 2010;
IUCN ICZM Protocol in theMediterranean from 2011), as
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the ICZM name suggests, these guidelines all advocate
enhanced horizontal and vertical integration and coordi-
nation (Harvey & Hilton, 2006; Humphrey & Burbridge,
2003; Portman, Dalton, & Wiggin, 2015). They include
a focus on intersectoral coordination rather than tradi-
tional sector-by-sector management; holistic, multidis-
ciplinary ecosystem-based planning; a dynamic, contin-
uous, evolutionary and iterative attempt to solve com-
plex problems; and the creation of newgovernance struc-
tures to accommodatemeaningful stakeholder participa-
tion and conflict resolution (Post & Lundin, 1996).
Attaining these goals has not been easy, however. In
Europe, ICZM began largely at the project level and of
nineteen European countries expected to follow an EU
Recommendation on ICZM which called for the develop-
ment of a national strategy by 2006, only nine complied.
A 1999 study of EU coastal states plus Norway, for ex-
ample, found a very uneven pattern of ICZM implemen-
tation (Table 2); distinguishing between plans that were
fully implemented, those merely formulated, and those
under development in the pre-formulation stage.
Of 182 coastal regions studied, 108 were recorded as
showing no progress in ICZM at all, and only Denmark
and the Netherlands had all coastal regions showing at
least some progress towards fully formulated or imple-
mented strategies (Elburg-Velinova et al., 1999).
Thus, despite these good intentions in oceans and
coastal governance, the implementation of large scale in-
tegrated approaches failed to achieve the broad aim of
moving beyond the sector-based management of ocean
resources that integrated approaches were meant to re-
solve (Jay et al., 2013; Portman et al., 2015; Vince, 2013,
2014, 2015). Overall, Humphreys and Burbridge (2003)
characterized European ICZM as emerging in rather iso-
lated pockets as a response to local situations, in the ab-
sence of or without connection to institutional arrange-
ments at more central levels of government.
This illustrates the difficulties involved in creating bet-
ter integrated policy mixes where multi-level or vertical
complications proliferate. Among other things this out-
come highlights the importance of understanding the
vertical dimension of policy mix design and securing in-
tergovernmental agreement as a pre-condition for mov-
ing forward in policy mix design and implementation.
That is, this situation might have been addressed by
a Europeanization initiative where the European Com-
mission bypasses national governments and joined up
the dots to create a European-wide ICZM policy. Instead,
however, the debate over ICZM featured a confrontation
between European Parliament and the Council, with the
emergence of many national sectoral interests opposed
to what they saw as unnecessary disturbance of existing
local arrangements.
The ultimate outcome was only a Recommendation
on ICZM (2002/413/EC) rather than the Directive that
many in the Parliament and the NGO community were
originally seeking (McKenna, n.d.). Although coordina-
tion was expected to be carried out by an ambitious
benchmarking scheme to identify leaders and laggards,
the scheme was not put in place in part because of con-
tinuing disagreement over what is to be measured.1
4.2. Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park
The experience of policy-making in a second case of
multi-level policy-making involving the Australia’s Great
Barrier Reef Marine Park, however, was quite different
as the central government was able to resolve many in-
tergovernmental issues and retain control and direction
over the policy. This case exemplifies the difficulties with
integrated policy implementation over four decades but
provides useful lessons about how governance arrange-
ments can help overcome integration problems.
The Park was established through the Great Bar-
rier Reef Marine Park Act (Commonwealth) 1975 which
defined the Great Barrier Reef Region (also Australia’s
largest World Heritage Area which was listed in 1981)
which extends from the low water mark, an area that
Table 2. State of ICZM in European Coastal Regions, 1999. Source: Elburg-Velinova, Valverde and Salman (1999, p. 15).
Countries with at least one coastal region where ICZM was
Under Development Formulated Fully Implemented
Belgium France Netherlands








1 Thus, a survey of the achievements and intentions of nineteen European countries with respect to the Recommendation on ICZM, showed only nine
even intended to develop a national strategy by 2006, the target date set in the Recommendation, six did not intend to meet this deadline and four did
not report their intentions (Janssen, 2004).
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is otherwise state jurisdiction in Australia’s coastal zone,
as part of this arrangement. The Park is managed util-
ising ecologically sustainably-based principles, a zoning
plan that includes multiple use areas and ‘provides pro-
tection of biodiversity values through a network of no-
take zones for 33 per cent of its area and for at least
20 per cent of every bioregion’ (Commonwealth of Aus-
tralia, 2013, pp. 5, 11).2 The Australian Federal govern-
ment used the Act, along with its international ratified
agreements and external affairs powers, to halt attempts
by the Queensland government to begin offshore oil and
gas exploration in the reef (Haward & Vince, 2008, p. 91).
The integration efforts made in this case were more
effective and serve as an example of successful multi-
level governance,multiple usemanagement,marine spa-
tial planning and integration between jurisdictions, sec-
tors and communities (see Kenchington & Day, 2011);
overcoming the challenges with vertical and horizontal
integration posed to achieve biodiversity conservation
in the face of complex political conflicts. The results
from the integrated management efforts made by gov-
ernments in the case of Australia’s Great Barrier Reef
Marine Park (GBRMP) highlight the point made in the
ICZM case above concerning the need to early recognize
and act on the appropriate dimension(s)—horizontal or
vertical or both—of a mix if better integration is to be
achieved, often involving the exercize of some central
control over local issues and concerns.
This can be seen in the activities undertaken around
the turn of the millennium when the GBRMP was re-
zoned in 2004 to provide better environmental protec-
tion by increasing the size of fishing no-take zones. This
exercise was met with opposition from the recreational
and commercial fishing groups who found the process in-
equitable (Sutton & Tobin, 2009, p. 250). Surveys found
recreational fishers ‘had low to moderate satisfaction
with the programme used to consult the public through-
out the rezoning process’, weremore likely to be support-
ive of the changes if consistent with their values, and be-
lieved that the outcomes of the process were ‘predeter-
mined’ (Sutton & Tobin, 2009).
Lack of communication, policy coordination and co-
operation between decisionmakers, agencies, key actors
and those affected by the policy (Briassoulis, 2004, p. 20)
were also recognized by the governing bodies as po-
tentially resulting in unfavourable outcomes and efforts
were taken to ameliorate them. The federal government
spent five years and AUS$200 million assisting affected
parties adjusting to the new arrangements (Fernandes
et al., 2005; Macintosh, Bonyhady, & Wilkinson, 2010).
Fernandes et al. (2005, p. 1742) argue that with-
out this financial assistance, community acceptance of
the new zoning arrangements would have been difficult
to achieve. However the key vertical integrative device
employed in this case was the creation of an Authority
which liaises and coordinates policies with other Federal
and Queensland government agencies within the frame-
work outlined in the Great Barrier Reef Intergovernmen-
tal Agreement (2009) (updated in 2015). The aim of the
Authority was to enhance environmental protection of
the reef, economic development and community partic-
ipation while minimising regulation (Sainsbury, Haward,
Kriwoken, Tsamenyi, &Ward, 1997, p. 27). It jointly man-
ages vertical coordination and decision making within
the region through different management tools includ-
ing Fishery Management Plans, Cruise Shipping Policy
for the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, Traditional Use
of Marine Resource Agreements, and Environmental Im-
pact Management policies (Day & Dobbs, 2013, p. 17;
GBRMP, 2014).
In addition to specific plans, planning authorities
and financing for enhancing inter-governmental co-
ordination, special efforts were also made in this case
by the Authority to enhance public participation oppor-
tunities and to develop vehicles intended to address con-
cerns raised in policy development processes. This is well
illustrated in the GBRMP rezoning process which took six
years to complete due to a complex community consulta-
tion process (Fernandes et al., 2005, p. 1738) but which,
in the end, was completed successfully only through the
cooperation of non-state or private actors, such as the In-
digenous community, environmental NGOs and the local
tourism industry.
5. Conclusions
Attaining better policy integration involves adopting pol-
icy tools capable of overcoming or avoiding conflicts and
contradictions in a policy mix. This is an important as-
pect of policy-making and policy design which is made
difficult to achieve in the ever more common practice
of the bundling of policy tools together into complex ar-
rangements in order to address complex multi-faceted
and multi-level policy problems.
The emergence of more, and more complex, mixes
raises many difficult questions regarding how best to in-
tegrate policy elements developed over time through a
range of processes from special pleading on the part of
affected interests to historical lock-in caused by the lay-
ering of one policy element on top of another.
Understanding how such mixes operate, what are
their strengths and weaknesses and how their problems
can be overcome are significant subjects of interest in
the policy sciences. Existing studies of integration, how-
ever, do not use a consistent terminology and often fail
to define the dependent variable carefully enough to
have been able to make much headway in addressing
many aspects of tool mix design. As a result, the cumu-
lative impact of empirical studies has not been great,
theorization has lagged, and the understanding of in-
tegration has not improved as much as it should have
over past decades (Chapman, 2003; Ring & Schroter-
2 The GBRMP has just undergone another bleaching event and is now being reviewed again for being listed as ‘in danger’ if not removed completely off
the UNESCO world heritage listing. This will no doubt intensify planning activities undertaken by the Board in the near future.
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Schlaack, 2010), undermining efforts to promote better
policy-making, policies and outcomes.
Design principles to promote integration in complex
mixes featuring high levels of verticality especially require
a broader viewof the elements found in policymixes than
is typically found in the literature on the subject (da Costa
Canoquena, 2013; del Río, 2009). To help resolve this is-
sue, the article developed a framework for analyzing inte-
gration utilizing the twin dimensions of horizontality and
verticality, noting the increased complexity which occurs
in cases where not only are issues of policy design cen-
tered on how best to deal with instrument interactions in
a single policy area or level of government butwhere they
span two or more such levels. The paper argues this ‘ver-
tical’ or multilevel dimension of more complex mixes has
not been taken into account enough in pastwork and that
this dimension has to be added to themore commonly ac-
knowledged ‘horizontal’ one in order to properly under-
stand the functioning of policy mixes and the means and
methods by which they may be enhanced.
Many environmental policies fall into this latter cate-
gory of both high horizontality and high verticality and
the article assessed two cases in this area of policy-
making sharing this same characteristic—one considered
a success and the other a failure—in order to determine
what lessons could be derived from them for the better
integration of environmental policy mixes.
The two cases illustrate several key design points.
First, they show that the institutional framework devel-
oped in the policy design stage is a crucial predictor
of success or failure in multilevel, multi-sectoral inte-
grated governance areas, with the ICZM case showing
the weaknesses of de-centralized inter-governmental ef-
forts while the GBRMP case illustrates the advantages
of the existence of multipurpose special bodies able to
cross agency and government jurisdictional boundaries.
Second, they show there is the need to move be-
yond the use of just ‘substantive’ tools designed to affect
production, consumption and distributive arrangements
and to include procedural tools such as public participa-
tion and stakeholder funding in policy mixes in order to
help integrate existing, and sometimes, rival policy initia-
tives into a more cohesive strategy (May, Jones, Beem,
Neff-Sharum, & Poague, 2005; Howlett, 2000).
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